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Case Comments
Commentaires d'arrêt

CRIMINAL LAW-DEFENCES-AUTOMATISMACCUSED KILLING WHILE SLEEPWALKING
ACQUITTAL OR NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY : R. v. Parks.
Isabel Grant* and Laura Spitz**
Background to the Case

In R. v. Parks' the Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity
to clarify the test for distinguishing between insane and non-insane
automatism and to locate sleep-walking, or somnambulism, within this
dichotomy. Its judgments accomplished neither purpose satisfactorily and
thus the case is more striking for its unusual facts than for its advancement
of the law. The judgment of the Chief Justice, in particular, reads more
like a trial decision than that of an appellate tribunal and generates more
questions than answers about the defences .
Mr. Parks was charged with the murder of his mother-in-law and the
attempted murder of his father-in-law. He drove twenty-three kilometres
across a busy Toronto highway, while sleep-walking, to the home of his
in-laws. Once at the house, Parks went upstairs and attacked his in-laws.
After the assault, he drove himself to the police station and turned himself
in saying : "Oh my God, I just killed someone ." The accused had been
facing serious financial problems and had stolen $30,000 from his employer,
which had resulted in his dismissal. Despite these crises he had apparently
been getting on well with his in-laws? Several of his family members had
suffered from sleep problems including sleep-walking, adult enuresis,
nightmares and sleep-talking.

* Isabel Grant, Associate Professor, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, British Columbia.
** Laura Spitz, B.A ., University of Toronto, 1989 ; LLB, University of British Columbia,
1993 .
I [1992] 2 S .C .R . 871, (1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 27; affg . (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 129,
56 C.C .C . (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A .).
2 June Callwood, The Sleepwalker (1990), suggests that a meeting had been scheduled
between Parks and his in-laws for the day after the attack to discuss his financial indiscretions.
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The trial judge put non-insane automatism to the jury but did not
charge the jury on the insanity defence. Parks was acquitted of murder
by the jury and subsequently of attempted murder by the trial judge. The
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, holding that Parks' conduct
was involuntary. Since the impaired consciousness was a function of sleep,
and sleep, is a "natural, normal condition", 3 the accused was not suffering
from a disease of the mind 4 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
dismissed the Crown's appeal.
The question before the Supreme Court of Canada was simple : was
Parks entitled to an . absolute acquittal on the basis that his acts were
involuntary, or was the involuntariness caused by a disease of the mind,
thus leaving him only with the defence of insanity's
The Defence ofAutomadsw

The defence of automatism is premised on the accused acting in a
dissociative state where his or her mind is not associated with his or her
actions. In R. v. Rabey7 Ritchie J. stated:
Automatism is a term used to describe unconscious, involuntary behaviour, the state
of a person who, though capable of action is not conscious of what he is doing.
It means an unconscious involuntary act, where the mind does not go with what
is being done .

3 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 141 (O.R .), 466 (C .C .C.) (C.A .) .
4 It was this distinction which enabled the court to distinguish epilepsy, which has
historically been classified as a disease of the mind, from sleep-walking. In R. v. Sullivan,
[1984] A.C . 156, [198312 All E.R . 673, the blouse of Lords concluded that an epileptic
seizure is pathological and hence a disease of the mind. After the Sullivan decision, Glanville
Williams predicted that sleep-walkers wouldbe "saddled with an insanity verdict': Textbook
of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1983), p. 666.
See also the South African case of R. v. Dhlamini, [195511 S.A.L.R. 120 (Transvaal
Prov. Div.) where the accused was acquitted absolutely of a killing he committed while
emerging from a nightmare. .For an interesting account of a case where a mother killed
her 19 year-old daughter after waking up from a nightmare in which the daughter was
being attacked by North Korean troops, see Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide:
Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans (1951), 5 Res Judicatae 29. The mother was acquitted
absolutely on the basis that it was not her act.
5 Now the defence of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, R.S .C . 1985,
c. C-46, s. 16, as am. S.C . 1991, c.. 43, s. 2. At the time of Parks, the defence was the
insanity defence and led to a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity". The recently
reformed law now refers to "mental disorder" and a verdict of "not criminally responsible
by reason of mental disorder".
6 For a more detailed discussion of this defence in the context of homicide see I. Grant,
D. Chunn and C. Boyle, The Law of Homicide in Canada (1993), forthcoming.
7 R. v. Rabey, [198012 S.C.R . 513, at p. 518, -54 C.C .C . (2d) 1, at p. 6, quoting
Lacourciere J. in R. v. K., [1971] 2 O.R. 401, at p. 402, 3 C.C.C. (2d) 84, at p. 84 (Ont.
H.C .).
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Because a successful defence of automatism leads to an acquittal, judges
have been wary of false claims . In R. v. Szymusiak$ the Ontario Court
of Appeal sounded a note of caution:

It [automatism] is a defence which in a true and proper case may be the only one
open to an honest man, but it may just as readily be the last refuge of a scoundrel.
It is for these reasons that a Judge presiding at a trial has the responsibility cast upon
him of separating the wheat from the chaff.

One of the established limits has been to disallow the defence where
mental illness has contributed to the dissociative state, on the basis that
the existence of mental disorder may make the accused more dangerous
in the future. There has also been a concern that accused persons with a
mental disorder could avoid the insanity/mental disorder defence, and the
indefinite hospitalization that historically went with it, in favour of a full
acquittal. Automatism has thus been divided into two forms: insane
automatism and non-insane automatism . The former is channelled into the
insanity/mental disorder defence while the latter results in an absolute
acquittal. Insane automatism refers to a particular manifestation ofthe mental
disorder defence going to negate the actus reus of the offence.9 It triggers
the application of section 16 of the Criminal Codelo and all the related
provisions." Non-insane automatism is an assertion that the Crown has failed
to prove a voluntary actus reus,12 that lack of voluntariness being caused
by some factor other than a disease of the mind, voluntary intoxication,13
or some internal weakness of the accused.14
8 R. v. Szymusiak (1972). 8 C.C.C . (2d) 407, at p. 413 (Ont. C.A.), cited in R, v.
Bartlett (1983), 5 C.C .C . (3d) 321 (Ont. H.C .), and R. v. Macrae (1987), 76 N.S .R. (2d)
30 (N.S . App. Div.) .
9 In R. v. Chaulk [1990] 3 S.C .R . 1303, at p. 1321, 62 C.C .C . (3d) 193, at p. 206,
Lamer C.J.C. expressly states that the mental disorder defence may be manifest through
an involuntary actus reus.
10 Supra, footnote 5.
11 For a discussion of the distinction between the two defences see Winifred Holland,
Automatism and Criminal Responsibility (1982-83), 25 Crim. L.Q. 95.
12 Strictly speaking, non-insane automatism is nota defenceat all but merely an assertion
that the Crown has failed to meet its burden of proving a voluntary actus reus. We refer
to it as a defence only in the sense that it is something that must be raised in evidence
by the accused. See Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277, [1958] 1 All E.R. 193 (Q .B .D.) .
19 The defences of mental disorder and intoxication have clearly narrowed the scope
left forthedefenceof non-insane automatism becauseifvoluntary intoxication is acontributing
factor to the dissociative state, intoxication is the only defence and if mental disorder
contributes, then the defence is channelled into s. 16 of the Criminal Code, supra, footnote
5.
14 Because of the different nature of the claims, the burden of proof differs. An accused
asserting a defence of insane automatism, that is a defence of mental disorder, is required
to prove that defence on a balance of probabilities. An accused raising a defence of non
insane automatism need only raise a reasonable doubtthat his or her actionswere involuntary.
For a useful discussion of the interaction of the burdens of proof for these defences see
the various judgments in R. v. Falconer (1990), 65 A.L .J .R. 20 (H.C. Aust .) .
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What distinguishes insane from non insane automatism is the cause
of the dissociative state. Prior to Parks, the general rule in Canada was
thought to be that if an individual was in a dissociative state as a result
of some. internal factor, or some personal psychological susceptibility, that
dissociative state would probably constitute a disease of the mind, -leaving
the accused only with the insanity/mental disorder defence. If, on the other
hand, the dissociative state was caused by some factor external to the accused,
such as a blow to the -head or involuntary intoxication,16 an individual would
have the defence of non-insane automatism open to hint or her.
The leading case for distinguishing between a disease of the mind leading
to an insanity/mental disorder defence and a defence of non-insane
automatism is the judgment of Martin J.A. in R. v. Rabey :16
In general, the distinction to be drawn is between a malfunctioning of the mind
arising from some cause that is primarily internal to the accused, having its source
in his psychological or emotional make-up or in some organic pathology, as opposed
to a malfunctioning of the mind which is thetransient effect produced by some specific
external factor such as, for example, concussion . Any malfunctioning of the mind, or
mental disorder having its source primarily in some subjective condition or weakness
internal to the accused (whether fully understood or not), may be a "disease of the
mind" if it prevents the accused from knowingwhat he is doing, but transient disturbances
of consciousness due to certain external factors do not fall within disease of the mind .

The classic example of an external cause is a blow to the head,17 -but other
causes of a dissociative state are more difficult to.characterize. For example,
hypoglycemia caused by not eating after - -taking insulin,18 and possibly
exposure to toxic fumes are considered external causes .19 ®n the other hand,
epilepsy,20 andhyperglycemia caused by diabetes?', areboth considered factors
internal to the accused and will be channelled into the insanity/mental
disorder defence. The issue in Parks was -where to locate sleep-walking
.
in this dichotomy?z
is See R. v. King (1982), 67 C .C .C . (2d) 549 (Out. C.A.) .
16 (1977), 37 C.C.C . (2d) 461, at pp. 477-478 (Out. C.A .), affd., supra, footnote 7
(S .C .C.).
17 See R. v. Adkins (1987), 39 C.C .C. (3d) 346 (B.C.C .A.). Theaccused was acquitted
of murder . One of the issues on appeal was whether non-insane automatism should have
been put to the jury on' the basis of evidence that the accused suffered a concussion in
an earlier fight with the victim and may have been acting involuntarily. The Court of Appeal
held that it was' not an error to leave the defence with the jury.
18
See R. v.', Quick, [1973] Q.B ..910; [1973] 3 All E.R. 347 (C.A .) .
19 See the dicta in R. 'v. Oakley (1986), 24 C:C .C. (3d) 351 (Out. C .A.) . The court
held that if a dissociative state was caused by exposure to toxic fumes it could constitute
an external cause. However, if the exposure had caused brain damages, it would constitute
a disease of the mind.
'
z° See R. v. Sullivan, supra, footnote 4.
21 See R. v. Quick, supra, footnote 18 .
22 The English Court of Appeal, in R. v. Burgess, [199112 All E.R. 769, shortly after
the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Parks, declined to follow Piirks and concluded
that sleep-walking is a disease .of the -mind, requiring treatment.
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The Judgments

There are two leading judgments in the case, those of Lamer C.J.C.
and La Forest J. Lamer C.J .C.'s discussion of automatism was unanimously
endorsed by the court, and all members except Lamer C.J.C. (Cory J.
concurring) also agreed with La Forest J ., both as to the reasons and as
to the disposition of Mr. Parks. The Chief Justice dissented on the issue
of disposition 23 We will examine both of the leading judgments in turn,
although we suggest that the judgment of La Forest J. is the most important
as it will provide more guidance for the future .
Lamer C.J.C.

The Chief Justice began his analysis with a discussion of case-law
relating to somnambulism, and found authority for the proposition that sleepwalking is not a disease of the mind.24 He noted two British decisions that
appear to go against this line of authority.25 He then discussed the decision
of the trial judge, and found it necessary to review the medical evidence
adduced at trial. In his opinion, three important points emerged:26
(1) the respondent was sleep-walking at the time of the incident; (2) sleep-walking

is not a neurological, psychiatric or other illness. it is a sleep disorder very common
in children and also found in adults; (3) there is no medical treatment as such, apart
from good health practices, especially as regards sleep.

At this point in his judgment, Lamer C.J.C. turned back to one of
the two British decisions referred to above, namely R. v. Burgess.27 He
was forced to do this both because the English Court of Appeal de
clined to follow the Ontario Court of appeal's decision in Parks, and
because the Crown relied upon Burgess in its submissions before the
Supreme Court of Canada 28 He determined that the facts of Burgess
were more or less similar to Parks, but that the evidence was completely
"different from or even contradictory to", 29 and therefore "clearly dis-

23 Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. both wrote short reasons to express disagreement with
the Chief Justice on the disposition issue.
24 R. v. Rabey, supra, footnote 16; Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland,
[1963] A.C. 386, [1961] 3 All E.R. 523 (H .L.); Ryan v. The Queen (1967), 40 A.L.J.R .
488 (H .C . Aust .); R. v. Cottle, [1958] N.Z .L.R . 999 (C.A .) ; R. v. Ngang, [1960] 3 S.A.L.R .
363 (Trans . P. Div.); R . v . Tolson (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 168; H.M. Advocate v . Fraser (1878),
4 Couper 70 .
25 R. v . Sullivan, supra, footnote 4, holding that epilepsy is a disease of the mind,
and R. v. Burgess, supra, footnote 22, holding that sleep-walking is a disease of the mind .
26 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 889 (S .C.R .), 38 (D .L .R.) .
27 Supra, footnote 22.
28 At the time of the trial and the appeal hearing, there were no cases the Crown
could cite supporting its position that sleep-walking is a disease of the mind.
29 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 890 (S .C.R .), 38 (D.L .R.) .
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tinguishable "30 from, that presented in the case at bar. Thé Chief Justice
concluded that:31
. . . in the instant case, based on the evidence and the testimony of the expert
witnesses heard, the trial judge did not err in leaving the defence of automatism
rather than that of insanity with the jury, and that the instant appeal should be dismissed.

In the final portion of his judgment, Lamer C.J.C. expressed concern
about granting an outright acquittal' to an accused in the circumstances of
Parks, and, dissenting on this point, suggested that the case be sent back
to the trial judge to determine whether it would be appropriate to attach
conditions to :Parks' acquittal under the auspices of a common-law order
to keep the -peace.

Lamer C .J.C.'s judgment is troubling for its dependence on medical
evidence and its explanation of the distinction between non-insane andinsane
automatism . Furthermore, it is significant that his analysis fails to account
for the lack of randomness in Parks' actions as this would seem particularly relevant to a discussion, 'of automatism, or voluntariness. Finally,
the reasoning behind .Lamer C.J.C.'s desire to invoke a common law
order to keep the peace is logically . inconsistent with the reasoning upon
which he upholds Parks' acquittal. We will deal with each of.these points
in turn . :
,
The ChiefJustice reviewed in some detail themedicalevidence adduced
at trial. By placing so much emphasis on expert evidence, Lamer C.J.C.
appeared to be saying that the legal determination of whether a particular
dissociative state is a disease of the mind, -while still a question of law,
will be based almost exclusively on the presentation of expert medical
evidence . Indeed, the answer to the question "is sleep-walking a disease
of the mind?" can only be "sometimes yes and sometimes no", depending
on whether the accused can muster adequate expert testimony supporting
the fact that he was not suffering from a disease or disorder . In so doing,
Lamer C.J.C. invited every accused who raises the defence of sleep-walking
to engage in a battle . of expert evidence with the Crown. Is it -a disease
of the mind? Will it recur? Is it treatable? All these. questions will have
to be litigated at every. trial- of this nature,, at great expense to both the
defence and to the state.

,In Parks, the accused was able to present evidence persuading the
court. that sleep-walking is "not regarded as an illness, whether physical,
mental or neurological",3z and the Crown offered no expert evidence to

30
31
32

dbid, at Op. 891 (S .C .R.), 39 (D .L.R.).
Ibid.
Ibid, at pp. 885 (S .C.R.), 35 (D .L.R).
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the contrary33 By contrast, it was held in R. v. Burgess34 that sleep-walking
is a disease of the mind and amenable to treatment. Lamer C.J.C.
characterized the evidence in Burgess as different from, if not contradictory
to, the evidence in Parks. To the extent that the prosecution in Burgess
was able to present experts to testify that sleep-walking is a disorder amenable
to treatment, this is true .35 The Parks evidence was overwhelmingly to the
contrary. However, the evidence in both cases was that a further violent
episode was extremely unlikely.
The most confusing part of Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment relates to how
one determines whether sleep-walking is a disease of the mind in a particular
case. He relied on the Ontario Court ofAppeal's dubious distinction between
sleep and sleep-walking, and its reliance on that distinction in identifying
the former as the cause of Parks' dissociative state. He concluded that as
sleep was the cause of the accused's mental state, and sleep is a normal
condition, Parks did not suffer from a disease of the mind. For there to
have been a finding to the contrary,36

there would have had to have been in the record evidence tending to show that sleepwalking was the cause of the respondent's state of mind . . . that is not the case here.
This is not to say sleep-walking could never be a disease of the mind, in another
case on different evidence.

This distinction does not make clear when sleep-walking would
constitute a disease of the mind. Everyone agreed that Parks was sleepwalking. Yet if it was not the cause of his mental state here, when would
it ever be? Sleep always precedes sleep-walking. Furthermore, this causal
distinction between sleep and sleep-walking obscures the fact that driving
across a major highway and killing a person is not usually seen as a normal
function of sleep. In other words, even ifParks's dissociative state was caused
by sleep, a normal or reasonable person does not react to sleep in that
way, and therefore it is his abnormal reaction to the normal condition that
ought to have been the focus of the court's attention37
33 In fact, as documented by Callwood, op. cit., footnote 2, the Crown presented almost
no evidence to rebut the defence's argument. Calwood hints that Crown counsel was
inexperienced and overworked compared to defence counsel. She also indicates that the
Crown assumed from early on that the defence would be one of insanity .
34 Supra, footnote 22 .
35 Because Lamer C.J .C . characterized Parks' dissociative state of mind as flowing from
sleep, not sleep-walking, the issue of treatability became relatively meaningless, and he found
that "there is no medical treatment as such, apart from good health practices, especially
as regards sleep" ; supra, footnote 1, at pp. 889 (S.C .R .), 38 (D .L.R.).
36 Aid, at pp. 891 (S .C .R.), 39-40 (D .L .R.) .
37 In R. v. Rabey, supra, footnote 16, for example, Martin J.A . concluded that Rabey's
abnormal reaction to an event in the normal course of life could be best characterized as
attributable to the internal make-up of Rabey, and therefore a disease of the mind. If the
focus had been on Parks' reaction to sleep, rather than to the fact of sleep per se, the court
might have been more willing to reach the same conclusion as in Rabey.
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Despite Lamer C.J.C.'s reliance on the expert evidence adduced at
trial, there was very little discussion of what harks actually did. The Chief
Justice- constantly referred to the brutal stabbing of harks' in-laws as the
"incidents". These "incidents", however, included a twenty-three kilometre
drive in the middle ofthe night to the home of his in-laws, where he stabbed
them both with a kitchen knife, killing his mother-in-law and seriously
injuring his father-in-law. Parks did not strike out in a random fashion at
just "anybody". Yet, no question was raised as to whether these might have
been, the actions of a directed, if not conscious, mind,38 nor was any
examination made of the significance of the lack of randomness, suggested
by Parks' actions. If Parks' mind did not direct his twenty-three kilometre
drive to a specific location, what did? Rogers and Mitchell39 make this point
about Rabey:
. . . one must ask : whose eyes saw, the victim, whose hands wielded the rock and
did the choking . If unconscious behaviour is truly involuntary and haphazard, why
in criminal cases is it always directed at precisely the target the accused's conscious
self would choose to- attach? Although such explanation is normally absent, many
judges accept as a given that dissociation results in accidental, involuntary actions.

In the final portion of his judgment, the Chief Justice suggested that
the case should be sent back to the trialjudge to determine whether it would
be. appropriate to use the common law power to make an order to keep
the peace to attach conditions to Parks' acquittal40 In so doing, the Chief
Justice appeared to contradict the earlier part of . hisjudgment on the relevance
of likelihood of recurrence. In concluding that the defence of non-insane
automatism was available, he relied on the unlikelihood'ofrecurring violence .41
However, in expressing his view on the need for an order to obey the peace,
he stressed the need to protect the public from Parks in the future, pointing
out that his first violent episode was unpredictable and thus predictions about
the future should not be relied upon .
Sopinka J. identified this inconsistency in a judgment on- this issue
only, and described the order with a quotation, from Plackstone :42
This preventative justice consists in obliging those persons, whom there is probable
ground to suspect offuture misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to give full assurance
to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not happen ; by finding pledges
or securities for keeping the peace, or for their good behaviour.

38 R. Rogers and C.N . Mitchell, Mental Health Experts and the Criminal Courts (1991),
p . 134, make a similar point : "Sleepwalkers, in fact, do not wander about aimlessly and
blindly unaware, rather they have their eyes open to avoid obstacles and know what they
want to do . . ." .
39 Ibid, p. 136.
40 Supra, footnote

1, at pp . 892-895 (S .C .R.), 40-42 (D.L .R.) . Only Cory J . concurred
with the Chief Justice on this point.
41 Ibid., at pp . 894 (S.C.R .), 41-42 (D.L.R .) .
42 Cited by Kerwin J. in Mackenzie v. Martin, [1954] S .C.R. 361, at p. 368, quoted
supra, footnote 1, at pp . 911 (S.C.R .), 54 (D .L.R .) . (Emphasis added by Sopinka J.).
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Sopinka J. referred to several lower court decisions43 similarly recognizing
that this common law power "cannot be exercised on the basis of mere
speculation, but requires a proven factual foundation which raises a probable
ground to suspect of future misbehaviour",44 and he found that:45

The uncontroverted evidence in this case is wholly inconsistent with such a
conclusion. The ChiefJusticecharacterizes that evidence as indicating that "the chances
of such an occurrence taking place again are for all practical purposes nil" . . . .

Finally, Sopinka J. expressed grave doubts about whether a power that
can be exercised "on the basis of `probable ground[s] to suspect future
misbehaviour' without limits as to the type of `misbehaviour' or potential
victims, would survive Charter scrutiny".46
With regard to the form that such an order could take, it is instructive
examine
cases where this power has been invoked or considered in the
to
.
In
past
both R. v. White, ex parte Chohan47 and Re Regina and Shaben48
the respective courts contemplated orders that strongly resembled "restraining orders" 49 In Parks, it is difficult to imagine what such an order would
accomplish . Can an order to keep the peace force an accused to control
what the courts have already labelled as uncontrollable (involuntary)
behaviour? Lamer C.J.C. could not have been contemplating an order
restraining Parks from coming into contact with the rest of the world, nor
one requiring Parks to sleep in a locked room or to have someone in
attendance while he slept. If Lamer C.J.C. was concerned that Parks might
exhibit violence again while sleep-walking, he must have been contemplating
some sort of order requiring Parks to get treatment for his sleep disorder .
43 R. v. White, exparte Chohan, [1969] 1 C.C .C . 19 (B .C.S .C .) ; Re Regina andShaben,
[1972] 3 O.R . 613 (Ont. H.C.); Stevenson v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Justice) (Q .B .,
June 8, 1987), unreported). In Regina v. White, ex parte Chohan, for example, the court
found that where a person has committed no offence, but ajudge has good reason to believe,
based on the person's behaviour in the past, that he or she may commit, or cause to be
committed, an offence "against the Queen's peace" in the future, the judge has thejurisdiction
to make a common law order to keep the peace and "be of good behaviour" .
44 Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 911 (S .C.R.), 54 (D.L .R .) .
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, at pp. 912 (S .C.R .), 54-55 (D.L .R.), referring to the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 (hereinafter the Charter). McLachlin
J. agrees with the reasons of Sopinka J. She further questioned whether it is appropriate
for the courts to grant remedies affecting the liberty of a subject in the absence of a request
to do so by the Crown; ibid, at pp. 914 (S.C.R .), 56 (D .L.R.).
47 Supra, footnote 43 .
4s Ibid
49 In R. v. White, ex parte Chohan, supra, footnote 43, for example, although the
magistrate was not satisfied that the informant had reasonable grounds for his fears that
Chohan would cause him personal injury, he made an order requiring both Chohan and
the informant to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
In Re Regina and Shaben, ibid, three men were ordered, among other things, to "stay
away from" a fourth man.
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Indeed, Lamer C.I.C. stated that an "order might be made requiring Parks
to do certain things suggested by a specialist in sleep disorders . . ."50 In
so doing, he spoke in favour of attaching conditions to Parks', "outright
acquittal" in ways that strongly resemble an order compelling Parks to seek
treatment, even in the absence of -a finding of mental disorder .51
The Chief Justice made a brief reference to section 7 of the Charter5z
in relation to whether àn .accused ought to be subjected to a hearing such
as the one he contemplated, and he suggested that if conditions are imposed,
they "must be rationally connected to the apprehended danger posed by
the person and go no further than necessary to protect the public from
this danger"53 IIe did not, however, consider the Charter implications flowing
from attaching a forcible .treatment order to a person who has been fully
acquitted54
La Forest .I.

In contrast to the fact based judgment of the Chief Justice, the reasons
of La Forest J. were almost entirely policy based. He began by accepting
Lamer C.J.C .'s view! of the medical evidence, but then went oil to hold
that the determination of, what is a disease of the mind has a substantial
policy component. La Forest J. premised his analysis on the fact that the
50
51

Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 894 (S .C .R.), 41 (D .L.R .),
Interestingly, what Lamer C.J.C. seemed to be advocating is similar to what is
envisaged by the new mental disorder provisions, that is, flexible dispositions for those found
not responsible. Although it is important to note that the new disposition provisions do
not authorize compulsory treatment of those found not criminally responsible . Section
672 .55(1) of the Criminal Code, supra, footnote 5, provides :
No disposition made under s . 672 .54 shall direct that any psychiatric or other
treatment of the accused be carried out or that the accused submit to such treatment.
52 Supra, footnote 46.
53 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 895 (S .C.R .), 42 (D .L.R .) .
54 In R. v. Rogers (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 481, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
considered whether the terms of an accused's probation order could require psychiatric
treatment. In that case the accused was apprehended on a charge of possession of a knife
for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and pleaded guilty to the included offence
of possession of a concealed weapon, He was sentenced to one day in jail, and fifteen months
probation, the terms of which included a requirement that he "seek and take whatever
psychiatric assessment or treatment that . . . [could] be arranged for : . . [him]"; ibid, at p .
483 . On appeal, the court found that a probation order which compels an accused to take
psychiatric treatment or medication is an unreasonable restraint upon the liberty and security
of the,person. Moreover, such a term is contrary to the fundamental principles of justice
as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, supra, footnote 46 and, save in exceptional circumstances,
cannot be saved by s . 1 (ibid, at p. 488) :
In my opinion, it is the protection .of the public which is the principal support for
an order compelling the compulsory taking of treatment or medication . That is
insufficient to save the order under s . 1 of the Charter.
Lamer C .J.C. did not refer to Rogers in his judgment .
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Crown has the burden to prove that the dissociative state was caused by
a disease of the mind. The Crown must thus establish that the policy reasons
for labelling the accused's condition a disease of the mind exist . He reviewed
the two approaches that have been taken to this policy component: the
internal cause theory and the continuing danger theory . He rejected the
internal/external distinction as being unhelpful in the context of sleepwalking, which could be characterized as being internally or externally
caused . With respect to the relevance of the likelihood of recurrence, La
Forest J. concluded that the presence of a continuing danger should make
a judge more likely to find a disease of the mind, but that the absence
of such danger should not preclude a finding of disease of the mind .
Finding the above concerns to be inconclusive, La Forest J. identified
two further policy considerations : the likelihood that the condition could
be feigned by an accused and the likelihood of opening the floodgates to
numerous claims based on somnambulism 55 Given the difficulty of feigning
the symptoms necessary to establish such a defence, and its apparent rarity
in the case law, he concluded that neither of these policy factors was of
concern in this case. Thus, almost by a process of elimination, he decided
that the accused was not suffering from a disease of the mind.
In our view, La Forest J.'sjudgment can most usefully be characterized
as reviewing the policy considerations which justify the Crown raising
insanity/mental disorder over the wishes of the accused. In other words,
it may not be enough for the Crown simply to prove that the accused had
a mental disorder which constitutes a disease of the mind. Rather it should
have to justify the outcome of that finding: hospitalization . -However, La
Forest J. referred only to the policy concerns in determining a disease of
the mind without discussing the substance of the concept itself. These policy
considerations do not in themselves determine the existence of disease of
the mind: for that one must turn to the test set out by Dickson J. in Cooper
v . The Queen:56

In summary, one might say that in a legal sense "disease of the mind" embraces
any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its
functioning, excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as
well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion.

The Cooper test provides the basis for determining the existence of a disease
of the mind where the accused asserts an insanity/mental disorder defence
and the policy concerns raised by La Forest J. can be seen as additional
considerations where the Crown is raising the defence against the wishes
of the accused. The Crown must show that the justification for potential
incarceration of the accused is present. The two policy approaches identified

case .

55

The likelihood of false claims seems more of an issue for the trier of fact in each

56

[198011 S.C .R . 1149, at p. 1159, (l980), 51 C.C .C . (2d) 129, at p. 144.
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by La Forest J., the. external/internal cause and the . continuing danger
approach, both attempt to address the same issue: is the accused likely to
be a threat to the community in future' and hence need hospitalization to
prevent that threat?
With respect to the external/internal distinction, La Forest J. rejected
it, almost summarily, for sleep-walking. As the internal/external distinction
forces a court to examine the nature and reasonableness of an accused's
reaction to a "normal" phenomenon,57 La Forest J.'s summary rejection
of the distinction' in this context permitted the court to overlook Parks'
abnormal reaction to the normal state of sleep. With respect to future cases,
LaForest J. says nothing of the applicability ofthe distinction in, for example,
psychological blow automatism, its most controversial context. He did
indicate, however, that the internal cause theory is "not a universal approach
to the disease of the mind inquiry"58 and that it is meant to be used only
"as an analytical tool, and not as an all-encompassing methodology" 59

La Forest J.'s analysis of continuing danger is also unsatisfying.. Both
La. Forest J. and Lamer C.J.C .'s judgments on this issue asked whether
the accused is likely to have a violent episode of somnambulism again. There
are two ways one could phrase the question regarding the likelihood of
recurrence : (1) is the accused likely to sleep-walk again?60 or (2) is the
accused likely to exhibit violent behaviour while sleep-walking again?61 ft
is easy to see that these questions may lead to different answers. The evidence
in both Parks and R. v. Purgess62 was that recurrence of violence was
unlikely" and yet by asking different questions, different conclusions were
reached on disease of the mind. One problem with focusing on the recurrence
of violence in Parks is that the likelihood of the initial violent incident
was also extremely remote and thus could not have been predicted .
Whenever a legal determination is based on the prediction of something
that is simply unpredictable, because its occurrence is so rare and poorly
understood, one wonders what function the test serves except in the most
obvious cases.
Under the old insanity provisions, applicable to Parks, the likelihood
of recurrent violence was clearly a factor on the court's mind because a
57 In R. v. Rabey, supra, footnote 7, the decision of a woman not to pursue a romantic
relation with Rabey; in Parks, sleep.
58 Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 902 (S.C.R .), 47 (D.L .R .) .-

59 Ibid.
60 This is howthe English Court of Appeal in R. v. Burgess, supra; footnote 22, phrased

the question.
61 This is how the Parks court, phrased the question .
62 Supra, footnote 22.
63 Callwood, op. cit., footnote 2, posits that the .reason Parks did .not seek bail for
his offences was his own fear that he would hurt other members of his wire's family.
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finding of not guilty by reason of insanity led to a indeterminate hospitalization. It was the accused's dangerousness, and not just the presence
of mental illness, that would justify indeterminate detention at the behest
of the Crown. However, the determination in Parks was not about whether
the insanity defence as a whole was satisfied nor about the appropriate
disposition for Parks. Rather, the issue was whether the accused suffered
from a disease of the mind, only the first step of the criteria in section
16 of the Criminal Code 64 In our view, in deciding whether the accused's
condition qualifies as a disease of the mind, the focus should be on whether
the condition which led to the violence is likely to recur, not on whether
the violence per se is likely to recur. In fact, in Lord Denning's leading
formulation of this factor he stated:6S
It seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and
is prone to recur is a disease of the mind.

Under the new mental disorder provisions not every accused found
not criminally responsible will necessarily go to hospital since absolute and
conditional discharges are also available.66 Thus the likelihood of recurrent
violence can now be considered at the disposition stage in determining
whether or not the accused needs hospitalization rather than at the stage
of determining responsibility for past actions.
La Forest J. rightly acknowledged that there will be people who believe
that the result in Parks impairs "the credibility of our justice system"67 He
wrongly concluded that these people would necessarily reject the insanity/
mental disorder defence as well68 People who are concerned about Parks
receiving an outright acquittal might be less concerned about him being
found not guilty by reason of insanity, which would then have resulted
in his involuntary hospitalization, at least providing for the possibility of
treatment for his sleep-walking. While we do not advocate that indeterminate
hospitalization was the most appropriate result in this case, we question
La Forest J.'s equation of these two verdicts.
64 Supra, footnote 5.
6s Bratty v. Attorney-General (Northern Ireland), supra, footnote 24, at pp. 412 (A.C.),

534 (All E.R.).
66 See Criminal Code, supra, footnote 5, s. 672.54.
67 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 908 (S .C .R.), 52 (D .L.R .) .
68 He stated, ibid, at pp. 908 (S.C.R .), 52 (D .L.R.) :
It may be that some will regard the exoneration of an accused through a defence of
somnambulism as an impairment of the credibility of our justice system . Those who hold
this view would also reject insane automatism as an excuse from criminal responsibility .
However, these views are contrary to certain fundamental precepts of our criminal law:
only those who act voluntarily with the requisite intent to commit an offence should be
punished by criminal sanction . The concerns of those who reject these underlying values
of our system of criminal justice must accordingly be discounted.
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The failure of the Supreme Court to take the opportunity in Parks
to delineate clearly the test for distinguishing between non-insane and insane
automatism may be attributable, at least in part, to two factors. First, judges
have historically been reluctant to label sleep-walking as a disease of the
mind and have treated it as an exception in the internal/external cause
dichotomy. Perhaps this is because, unlike other conditions that come before
them in mental disorder cases, judges can identify with someone who sleepwalks. 1Vorval Morriss points out that we all sleep and 'we have all
experienced altered levels of consciousness in the process of sleep. Hence
it may be easier for judges and juries to identify with losing control over
one's actions in sleep-altered states than in some other forms of altered
consciousness.
Secondly, Parks may simply have been an impossible case for any
appellate court. The defence evidence was overwhelming and the gown's
case woefully inadequate. Once a jury accepted the claim, or at least had
a reasonable doubt, that Parks was sleep-walking when he drove across
town and killed his mother-in-law and almost killed his father-in-law, an
appellate court could only have reversed this verdict by concluding that
sleep-walking is a disease of the mind, a. . conclusion. Which, at the time
of the decision, Would almost certainly have- led to the indeterminate
detention of Parks in a psychiatric facility . The evidence indicated that,
by the time the appeals were heard, Parks had , made considerable efforts
to pull his life' together and thus there seemed. little point in hospitalization .
The reluctance of the court to reach a conclusion that would have
resulted in the indeterminate detention of Parks reflects the inadequacy of
the old disposition provisions of the insanity defence. The new mental
disorder provisions of the Criminal Code have more flexibility in disposition,
allowing, in appropriate cases, for an absolute or conditional'discharge. Thus,
an accused found not criminally responsible need no longer automatically
face indeterminate detention. This flexibility would have addressed the
concerns of the majority in not hospitalizing Parks indefinitely and of the
Chief Justice in allowing for some supervision of Parks in the future .
In conclusion, Parks can best be seen as a case with a very unusual
fact pattern, decided under the old insanity provisions, and guided by an
effort to avoid a seemingly unjust result for a particular accused. Consequenily, the case is only of limited relevance to future cases in. this area.
We-Would point to La Forest J.'s review of policy concerns regarding disease
of the mind as the most .useful portion of the judgment, but would limit
its relevance to instances where the Crown is asserting mental disorder against
the wishes of an accused.

61

Loc. cit., footnote 4, at p . 32 .
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ECCLESIASTICAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTSGOVERNING DOCUMENTS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONSNATURAL JUSTICE : Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer.
M.H. Ogilvie*
Introduction
Since the mid-sixteenth century, separation from the world has been
a fundamental feature of those branches of the Christian church derived
from Anabaptism, the biblically most literal movement within the Protestant
Reformation. Some Anabaptist groups, such as the Mennonites, have
nonetheless become substantially assimilated within the modern world as
a result of the devastating impact of liberalism and secularism over the past
century or so. Other groups, such as the Amish or the Hutterian Brethren,
have successfully maintained their historic distance, requiring members to
live in small, self-sufficient communities, holding all things in common, after
the example of the primitive Christian church' and as a central theological
tenet of their faith.
Yet, with fewer than 10,000 members, Hutterites in Canada have
resorted to the civil courts with surprising frequency, perhaps to a greater
extent per capita than other Christian denominations,2 when internal
community dispute resolution mechanisms fail. Obedience to the New
Testament injunction of community of property, which is the root of all
Hutterite civil litigation, apparently blinkers members to Paul's instruction
to the early Christians in Corinth not to go to law before "unbelievers"
but to resolve disputes within the Christian community. 3
In Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer,4 representative
plaintiffs for the Hutterian Lakeside Colony in Manitoba, sought a
declaration that the defendants had ceased to be members, by virtue of
self-excommunication, in response to internal disciplinary proceedings, and
* M.H. Ogilvie, Professor of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa.
1 Acts 2:44.
2 Reported cases which have gone to the Supreme Court of Canada include: Barickman
Hutterian Mutual Corp. v. Nault, Lafreniere andZastre, [1939] S.C.R. 223, [1939] 2 D.L.R.
225; Walter v. Attorney-General of Alberta, [1969] S.C.R. 383, (1969), 3 D.L .R. (3d) 1;
Hofer v . Hofer, [1970] S.C .R. 958, (1970) 13 D.L .R . (3d) 1; Lakeside Colony of Hutterian
Brethren v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C .R. 165, (1992), 97 D.L,R. (4th) 17, [1993] 1 W.W.R.
113 (sometimes referred to as Lakeside Colony). In addition, there are a number of unreported
lower court decisions, as well as the use ofjudicial orders to eject members from communities
or to restrain them from returning to communities.
3 Cor. 6:1-8.
4 Supra, footnote 2.
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that they physically leave the Colony. The defendants argued that they
remained members on the ground that their attempted expulsion was invalid
because of an absence of natural justice in the Colony's disciplinary
procedures. Reversing the decisions of both the Manitoba Queen's Bench
and the Court of Appeal,5 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the
defendants had not received adequate notice and therefore were entitled
to remain on the Colony . In giving judgment for the six member majority
(McLachlin J. dissenting), Gonthier J. discussed three legal issues raised
by the dispute: (i) thejurisdiction of civil courts over disputes within religious
associations ; (ii) the legatauthority of and relationship among the governing
documents of a religious institution; and (iii) the application of the rules
ofnaturaljustice to dispute resolution procedures within -religious institutions
where no provision is otherwise made for them. Whether or not those issues
were adequately resolved is the subject of this comment.
The Case
The Lakeside Colony was no stranger to problems prior to this case.
When the Colony was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1979, the SchmiedenLeut Conference, to which the Lakeside Colony belongs, imposed three
overseers from other colonies over Lakeside. The overseers 'succeeded in
putting the Colony's financial affairs in order and remained in charge when
a dispute arose with one of the defendants, Daniel Ilofer Sr. In 1986, two
of the overseers learned that another colony had been required to pay
penalties for patent infringement for manufacturing hog-feeders, the licence
for which was held by a non-colony company, C & J Jones Ltd. to which
it had been assigned by the patent holder, another colony, the Crystal Springs
Colony . The senior elder ofthe Conference, who had appointed theoverseers,
was also the minister and president of the Crystal Springs Colony and did
not inform any of the Ilutterite colonies that his colony received fifty per
cent of the profits of. the patent .6

Hofer asserted that he had invented the novel features of the feeders
and therefore owned the patent, and despite instructions from the overseers
refused to cease manufacturing hog-feeders. Jones Ltd. subsequently de
manded damages for patent infringement from the Lakeside Colony which
agreed to a settlement of $10,000.00. Believing his own Colony to be entitled
to the patent, Hofer deceived the bank on which the cheque was drawn
to stop payment on 20 January 1987. The overseers called an "annual
5 (1989), 63 D.L.R . (4th) 473, 62 Man. R. (2d) 194 (Man. Q.B .) ; (1991), 77 .R
.L
D
.
(4th) 202, 70 flan. R. (2d) 191 (Man . C.A.), Hùband and Lyon JJ .A. for the majority
and O'Sullivan J.A. dissenting.
6 For a journalist's account of the restructuring of Hutterite life and the difficulties
experienced in the colonies as a result of the activities of this senior elder, see "Jacob's
Ladder", Saturday Night (April 1992), p. 30 . See also, William Janzen, Limits on Liberty:
The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada (1990).
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meeting" of the Colony on 21 January 1987 for later that same day, but
there was no express notice of the agenda . All three courts agreed that
Hofer's conduct was known both to Hofer and to the Colony to be the
reason for calling the meeting. The meeting began with a discussion of the
patent issue, but Hofer became sufficiently disruptive that he was asked
to leave. While he was out of the meeting, the members agreed to discipline
him by a mild form of shunning whereby he would be required to eat
and worship separately until he repented. Hofer refused to accept the ruling
when called back into the meeting and was told by the chairman that "he
is no member, he is out of the church" .7

The overseers hoped that Hofer would repent after a cooling offperiod
of ten days and called another meeting for 31 January 1987 . Hofer received
no notice of a specific agenda for this meeting, although the three courts
agreed that he knew that his conduct was the major item of the agenda .
The meeting was called for noon, and after it, in the afternoon, the senior
elder of the Conference was consulted and he recommended by letter that
no higher hearing be given to Hofer, but that he "be separated" from the
Colony . That letter was read to another Colony meeting on the evening
of 31 January 1987, which Hofer again refused to attend, and the meeting
decided that Hofer and his two sons who sided with him, "were no more
members and out of the church" .8
The Hofers subsequently remained on the Colony, living and worshipping apart from the community and gathering around them other
community members who supported Hofer Sr. At a regularly scheduled
meeting of the Conference ministers in February, it was decided to offer
Hofer another meeting with these ministers to consider the matter . However,
six days after that offer, Hofer and his two sons received a lawyer's letter
asking them to vacate the Colony . When they did not do so, a statement
of claim was filed on 25 February 1987 . In light of this action, the Hofers
declined to attend the profferred meeting and received no notices of
subsequent Colony meetings to discuss the stand-off. Finally at the meeting
of the Colony on 21 July 1988, the excommunication of Hofer, his two
sons and one supporter was "ratified, sanctioned and confirmed" .9
At trial, Ferg J. found that Hofer was excommunicated on either the
21 January or 31 January by virtue of his refusal to accept the discipline
imposed on him, so that the Colony was left with no alternative but
excommunication. The judge regarded the merits of the Colony's decision
to be a matter for the Colony and that the Colony's own procedures were
properly followed. Without deciding whether the rules of natural justice
could be imported into the Colony's procedures, Ferg J. stated that Hofer
Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 205 (S .C .R .), 43 (D .L.R.), 141 (W .W .R .) .
$ Ibid, at pp. 208 (S.C.R.), 45 (D.LR.), 143 (W.W .R .) .
9 Ibid, at pp . 215 (S.C.R .), 50 (D.L .R .), 148 (W.W .R .) .
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chose to waive opportunities to present his case by not attending meetings
and therefore waived any other rights he may have.10 While the trial judge
found the disciplines of the Hutterites to be "harsh", ,, he thought them to
be protected as freedom of religion, and that Hofer's freedom to live as
he wished was also protected. Thus, Ferg J. ordered Hofer and his supporters
to leave the Colony without any worldly goods, as is the Hutterite practice .
The majority in the Court of Appeal upheld this decision . Huband
J.A. found that no formal vote of excommunication was taken, but that
there was a commonunderstandingthat failure to submit to shunning resulted
automatically in excommunication. Paradoxically, the court further found
that excommunication occurred at the meeting on 21 January and was
reaffirmed at the meeting on 31 January 1987 . Apparently, the Court of
Appeal did not think that Hofer should be given any time whatsoever after
21 January to consider his response or even to repent! The court regarded
Hofer as fairly dealt with in the circumstances and was unwilling to interfere,
unnecessarily, provided -the excommunication was reasonable and not based
on a "whim or caprice " .12

In contrast to the trial judge, the Manitoba Court of Appeal dealt with
two issues in greater detail, the, jurisdiction of civil courts in relation to
internal disputes in religious -associations and the importation of principles
of natural justice into the procedures of religious organizations. On the basis
of only two earlier cases," the court stated that as a general rule courts
should not become involved in resolving internal disputes unless civil rights
or property rights are implicated . The courts should never adjudicate issues
of faith or doctrine.14 Where an issue, such as excommunication, impacts
solely on a person's status within a- religious organization, courts should
not be involved, even where the excommunication procedures do not comply
with the requirements of natural justice . Where a property issue is linked,
courts are required to accept jurisdiction, as occurred, for example in Hofer
v. Hofer,15 in which, the . excommunicated plaintiffs sought a winding-up
order for another Hutterite colony, together with an equitable division of
the assets, and the courts both asserted jurisdiction and applied principles
of natural justice. Huband J.A . thought Lakeside Colony to be a similar
case insofar as the associatedproperty issue was the defendants' counterclaim
to be entitled to continue living .on the Colony .16
10

Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 487 (D.L .R .), 204 (Man . R.) (Q.B.) .

Suprajootnote 5, at pp . 224 (D .L.R .), 208 (Man. R.) (C.A .) .
Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church v. Trustees of Ukrainian Greek Orthodox
Cathedral of St. Mary (No. 2), [1939] 2 D.L.R. 494, [1939] 1 W.W.R . 481 (Man. C.A.);
affd., [1940] S.C.R. 586, [1940] 3 D.L .R. 670, and Hofer v. Hofer, supra, footnote 2.
14 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 222 (D .L.R .), 207 (Man. R.) (C.A .) .
1s Supra, footnote 2.
16
Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 234-235 (D .L.R.), 215-216 (Man. R.) (C .A .) .
12
13
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By analogy with Hofer v . Hofer,17 the Manitoba Court of Appeal
concluded that the defendants had no further claim on the communal
property of the Colony once they were excommunicated and should be
physically removed from the Colony, without any worldly goods. The court
expressed considerable sympathy for Hofer Sr. and his supporters and
thought it "manifestly inequitable" 1e for them to be forced out without a
share of the value of the property to which they contributed .
In a wide-ranging dissenting judgment, O'Sullivan J.A. found thatHofer
was denied natural justice. Hofer's expulsion was not on the agenda explicitly
for any meetings and Hofer was disciplined while he was absent, and so
informed after he rejoined meetings, without an opportunity to be heard.
O'Sullivan J.A. also held that, since Hutterites do not own property
individually, the plaintiffs had no property right on which to rely in invoking
the jurisdiction of the court to expel Hofer. Although he did not make
any decision about patent ownership which was the original reason for the
dispute, he decided there was overwhelming evidence to support Hofer's
position and that Hofer, acting in good faith and genuinely believing himself
to be the inventor, correctly challenged the commercial projects in which
the senior elder was engaging as inconsistent with the Hutterian understanding of the Christian life. The dissenting judge also considered the legal
authority of and interrelationship of the governing documents of the
Hutterian Brethren, concluding that the articles of association, not the federal
incorporation act, interpreted in the light of the whole set of beliefs of the
Hutterites should govern, but for their suspension by the overseers.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with O'Sullivan
J.A.'s conclusion that Hofer had been denied natural justice and was illegally
expelled from membership in the Lakeside Colony.
IfHofer was to overcome the Colony's position that he had been legally
excommunicated, he had to show that, if there was some form of conduct,
such as a vote, to expel him, the rules ofnaturaljusticehad notbeen complied
with prior to that final act. Therefore, in considering the factual issues,
Gonthier J., for the majority, focused on two questions, was there a vote
to expel and had the rules of natural justice been complied with in the
pre-expulsion proceedings?
In relation to the former question, Gonthier J. noted three ways in
which Hutterite practices rendered a definitive answer difficult: Hutterite
discipline proceeds by a series of steps whereby contact with the member
is withdrawn; then when "expelled", members are not asked to leave the
colony immediately; and, even when finally asked, are not physically ejected,
since Hutterites practice non-resistance . While this leaves a colony in a
difficult position when an expelled member chooses not to depart, it did
Supra, footnote 2.
11 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 235 (D .L.R.), 216 (Man. R.) (C.A.) .
17
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not deter the Supreme Court from concluding that Hofer Sr. was expelled
by the voting members of the Colony on.21 January. 1987. The court further
found definite acts of expulsion for his sons on 31 January 1987 and for
his other supporters subsequently .19
In relation to, the latter question, the Supreme Court focused on one
element of natural justice, sufficient notice, and declined to consider the
requirements of an unbiased tribunal and an opportunity to. make repres
entations.20 With respect to Hofer Sr;, the court found that no sufficient
notice was given of his pending expulsion. For the 21 January meeting,
ofer knew that his recent behaviour. was on the unwritten agenda but
not his expulsion, ,of which he had only a few moments notice in the course
ofthe meeting, not (in the opinion of the court) sufficient-notice for a decision
of this magnitude. Moreover, two of the voting members of the Colony,
ofwhich there were twelve, -including Hofer and his two sons, had no notice
that the expulsion was to be .considered and. were absent from the meeting.
Instead, the court thoughtthat the proper procedure to follow, once expulsion
becamean issue at the méeting, would have been to call a subsequent meeting
with adequate notice to all members of the expulsion item on the agenda .
The court further found that the ten day cooling period was to give Hofer
time to repent, so that' the meeting of 31 January was irrelevant. With
respect to both Hofer's sons. and other supporters, the court found that no
notice had ever been given to them that.their expulsions would be considered
at any meeting of the colony . Moreover, the fact that the members regarded
their expulsion to follow automatically that of Hofer, was no reason not
to give them sufficient notice. Thus, all of the defendants remained as
. .
members of the Colony with a right to reside there .21
McLachlin J. found otherwiseAn her view, the requirements of natural
justice are flexible and the ultimate issue is whether the procedures followed
are fair. Since the purpose of a notice requirement is to permit a person
to make a defence, that purpose was satisfied because Hofer knew that
selfexpulsion would follow from his conduct and he had opportunities to
defend himself. McLachlin J. thought that the entire process contemplated
no role for a formal notice since.the members did not make a decision,
but that Hofer was obliged to decide whether to comply with the discipline
by repenting. If formal notice serves no purpose, then a failure to give notice
is not a breach of the rules of natural justice.22 McLachlin noted that the
meeting of 31 January substantially cured any notice defect in relation to
the earlier meeting since . Hofer was again offered the opportunity of
reconciliation .23 In conclusion, McLachlin J. regarded the Colony's dealings
19

2°
21
22
23

Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 216-220 (S .C.R.), 50-54 (D .L.R.), 148-151 (W.W.R.).
Infra, the text, commencing at footnote 64.
Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 220-225 (S .C.R.), 54-58 (D .L.R.),152-155 (W.W.R.).
Ibid, at pp ., 230 (S.Ck), 61-(D.L.R .), 159 (W .W.R.).
Ibid, at pp . 232-233 (S .C.R.), 62-63 (D .L.R.), 160-161 (W.W.R .) .
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with Hofer to be "open, considered and eminently fair" 24 She regarded
the problem to be a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between the
Hutterian tenet of peaceful submission and Hofer's "defiant spirit of
independence"?5
This construction of the events by McLachlin J. is problematical for
several reasons. First, shunning essentially amounts to expulsion since the
decision to shun leaves the person shunned with the sole option of accepting
that decision with no further opportunity for discussion. Once made up,
the mind of the Colony cannot afterward be changed except by the
repentance of the person shunned. Secondly, the Hutterite practice of
discussion and consensus is predicated upon a fair opportunity for all voting
members to participate before a consensus is reached. Its democratic nature
is much vaunted by the Hutterian Brethren. Therefore, a sudden decision
in the absence of a voting member, to shun that member without prior
notice of the decision and no subsequent opportunity to do anything other
than repent, is contrary to Hutterian practice . In fact, it could be argued
that the factual problem at the heart of the case is the head-on collision
of two Hutterite practices: consensual decision-making by all voting
members and shunning. When there is no compliance with the former, the
object of the latter is placed in an impossible position. Thirdly, McLachlin
J. appears to have overlooked the fact that expulsion by shunning was a
last minute agenda item at the meeting of 21 January, originally called
to review Hofer's conduct in respect to the patent. Fourthly, while
shunning seems, prima facie, exclusive to Hutterian communities, on closer
examination, shunning is a practice commonly indulged in, in many
workplaces, such as offices, university departments or law firms, to drive
out perceived nonconformists, whose nonconformity may result in doing
ajob better than or differently from, yet as successfully as, the others . Should
dismissal proceedings ever occur, the defendant would, like Hofer, appear
to be defiant or "uncollegial" . Thus, if extended beyond the apparently
peculiar facts of Lakeside Colony, McLachlin J.'s approach might result
in great injustice.
McLachlin J's general approach to the dispute in Lakeside Colony
was to resolve it with minimal judicial interference in the internal affairs
of a closely-knit religious community, whereas the majority of the Supreme
Court assumed interference to be within the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
It remains, then, to examine the relationship of the civil courts to religious
associations through the three substantive legal issues discussed by Gonthier
J. for the court.

24 Ibid, at pp. 232 (S.C.R .), 63 (D .L.R.), 161 (W .W .R .) .
zs Ibid, at pp. 233 (S.C.R.), 63 (D .L.R.), 161 (W .W .R.) . The analogy with Luther
and Rome both overstates the importance of the dispute between Hofer and the Lakeside
Colony and understates the importance of the dispute at the heart of the Reformation.
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Civil Jurisdiction over Religious Associations
Both the Manitoba Court of Appeal and the Supreme (Court of Canada
expressed reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over questions of membership
in a voluntary association, especially a religious one. Speaking for the
Supreme Court, Gonthier J. restricted that jurisdiction in two ways. First,
he was content to restate the opinion expressed over fifty years ago by
Crocket J. in Ukrainian Creek Orthodox Church v. Ukrainian Greek
Orthodox Cathedral of St Mary the Protectoress (Mo. 2):26
. . . it is well settled that, unless some property or civil right is affected thereby, the
civil courts of this country will not allow their process to be used for the enforcement
of a purely ecclesiastical decree or order. ,

While this statement appears to be restricted to the use of civil courts
to enforce church decisions, it was interpreted more widely byboth appellate
courts in Lakeside Colony to authorize civil courts to engage in a broader
review, provided a property or civil right is involved in the expulsion of
a member. The case actually involved a request for an injunction to restrain
an excommunicated priest from officiating at church services and cited no
earlier authorities.
In Hofer v. Hofer,27 the Supreme Court ofCanada found that the request'
for a winding-up order and distribution of a colony's assets provided the
necessary element of property for actual intervention, and in Lakeside Colony
the contractual right of members of the colony to live there as long as they
are members justified the exercise of jurisdiction over the dispute. Indeed,
because- the contractual right involved the livelihood of the Hofers, it was
said to be on the same footing as a property right.28
The second restriction placed on a court's jurisdiction by Gonthier
J. was that courts should not review the merits of the decision to expel,
but should simply determine "whether the purported expulsion was carried
out according to the applicable rules with regard to the principles. of natural
justice, and without mala fides" 29 Since the ratio decidendi of Lakeside
Colony is that ecclesiastical procedures are subject to the rules of natural
justice, presumably the restriction is limited to curial review of thesubstantive
merits of the decision . The necessity for either restriction on Canadian courts
may be questioned .
The proposition that courts should decline jurisdiction over disputes
about the expulsion of members where a property or civil right is not also
at issuewas first expressed in several late nineteenth century Ontario decisions
26 Supra, footnote 13, at pp. 591 (S .C .R.), 671 (D .L .R.).
27 Supra, footnote 2.
28 Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 174 (S .C.R .), 20 (D.L.R.), 118 (W .W .R.). See also : Lee

v. Showman's Guild of GreatBritain, [1952] 1 All R.R. 1175, at p. 1180 (C .A.), per Denning
L .J.
29 Ibid., at pp . 175 (S .C .R.), 20-21 (D.L .R.), 119 (W.W.R .) .
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overlooked by the appellate courts in Lakeside Colony . Thus, courts declined
jurisdiction because no civil right was thought to be at stake in Dunnet
v. Forneri30 where an order to restrain a minister from excommunicating
a lay person and excluding him from the Eucharist was refused, and in
Pinke v. Bornhold3l where a member was expelled from membership on
the ground offinancial irregularities, while serving as a congregational trustee.
Conversely, in Tully v. Farrell532 the court exercised jurisdiction to set aside
the improper election of a church warden because female lessees of pews
had voted (the right of pew holders to vote being a property right recognised
by the civil law).
Subsequent cases involving the expulsion of members, of which there
are many, although none were considered by any of the courts in Lakeside
Colony, suggest that the substantive content of "property and civil rights"
is either very narrowly circumscribed in application or regarded by many
Canadian lower courts as irrelevant to the exercise of jurisdiction. In some
categories of cases involving religious organizations generally, a property
or civil right nexus is obvious, for example, disputes over church property
held in trust33 or clergy dismissal cases,34 which raise contractual issues . Yet,
courts have willingly decided a wide variety of cases involving lay discipline
in which neither element is obviously present.35
Courts have sustained expulsions from membership for insufficient
financial support; 6 non-attendance at worship;37 financial irregularities while
serving as trustee;38 disruption of meetings;39 "apostasy" ;4o alleged writing
of libelous letters about a priest;41 and for no stated reason 42 Courts have
3° (1877), 25 Gr . 199 (Ont. Ch .) .
31 (1904), 8 O.L .R. 575 (Ont . H.C .) .
32 (1876), 23 Gr . 49 (Ont . Ch.) .

33 See generally: M.H. Ogilvie, Church Property Disputes: Some Organizing Principles
(1992), 42 U.T.L .J . 377.
34 See generally: M.H. Ogilvie, Ecclesiastical Law-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts-Status
of Clergy: McCaw v. United Church of Canada (1992), 71 Can. Bar Rev. 597. See also
a later case: Davis v. United Church of Canada (1992), 92 D.L .R. (4th) 678, 8 O.R . (3d)
75 (Ont. Gen . Div .).
35 The following paragraph and footnotes are taken from Ogilvie, ibid, at pp . 607608.
36
Patillo v. Cummings (1915), 24 D.L .R. 775 (N .S .C .C .) .
37
Ibid.
38 Pinke v. Bornhold, supra, footnote 31 .
39 Cohen v. The Congregation of Hazen Avenue Synagogue (1920), 47 N.B .R . (N.B .
Ch .D .) .
40 Christenson v. Bodner (1975), 65 D.L.R . (3d) 549 (Man . Q.B.); Zebrowski v.
Jehovah's Witnesses (1988), 87 A.R . 229 (Alta. C.A .) .
41 Zawidoski v. Ruthenian Greek Catholic Parish of St. Hadimir and Olga, [1937]
2 D.L .R . 509 (Man . K.B.) .
42 Otis v. James (1922), 22 O.W .N. 325 (Ont. H.C.).
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also been willing participants in disputes with the laity over the right to
burial in consecrated grounds;43 access to church records;44 internal elections
to. congregational offices;45 and damages for lost business _profits resulting
from exclusion from a religious conimunity. 46 In many cases, the courts
intervened to overturn church decisions on the grounds of procedural
irregularities4 7 In several cases, the courts declined to intervene either on
the ground that there were no such irregularities4$ or that internal procedural
routes had not been exhausted 491n only two cases, the earliest cases, Dunnet
v. Porneriso and Pinke v. Bornhold,51 did the courts decide that intervention
was outside civil jurisdiction.
Prima facie, many of these cases do not involve a property or civil
right as understood by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vkrainian Greek
Orthodox Church v. Trustees of Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Cathedral of
St.
Mary (No. 2),52 Hofer v. Hofer53 or Lakeside Colony or by lawyers
generally, that is, a right in the common law of property, contract, tort
or restitution. On the other hand, as I have argued elsewhere,54 there is,
in these cases an underlying assumption, occasionally explicitly stated in
lay discipline cases,55 that lay discipline is based on contract . Religious
associations have long been regarded by the common law to be voluntary
associations and the relationships - -among members to be a multilateral
contract 56 Thus, it is arguable that . the "civil . right" which provides the
43 Dame Henriette Brown v. Les curés et marguilliers de l'oeuvre et fabrique de Notre
Dame de Montréal (1874), L.R. 6 P.C . 157 (P.C.).
44 Wetmon v. Bayne, [1928] 1 D.L.R . 848, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 519 (Alta. App. Div.) .
45 Fully v. Farrell, supra, footnote 32.
46 Heinrichs v. Wiens (1916), 31 D.L .R. 94 (Bask. S.C.).
47 Dame Henriette Brown v. Les curés et marguilliers de loeuvre et fabrique de Notre
Drame dé Montréal, supra, footnote 43; Tully v. Farrell, supra, footnote 32; Patillo v.
Cummings, supra, footnote 36 ; Heinrichs v. Wiens, ibid ; Cohen v. The Congregation of
Hazen Avenue synagogue, supra, footnote 39; Otis v. James, supra, footnote 42; Zawidoski
v. Ruthenian Greek Catholic Parish ofst Vladimir and Olga, supra, footnote 41 ; Christensen
v. Bodner, supra, footnote 40 .
4s Wetmon v. Bayne, supra, footnote 44; Zebrowski v. Jehovah's Witnesses, supra,
footnote 40 .
49 Zebrowski v. Jehovah's Witnesses, ibid
so supra, footnote 30.
51 supra, footnote. 31 .
52 supra, footnote 13 .
53 supra, footnote 2.
54 Ogilvie, loc. rit, footnote 34 .
Ss Dunnet v. Forneri, supra, footnote 30; Dame Henriette Brown v. Les curés et
marguilliers de loeuvre et fabrique de Notre Dame de Montréal, supra, footnote 43 .
56 See, for example, Lyster v. Kirkpatrick (1866), 26 IJ .C .Q.P. 217, at p. 225 (C.A .),
per Draper C.J.; Dunnet v. Forneri, ibid, at pp . 205-206, per Proudfoot V.C.; Johnson
v. Glen (1879), 26 Gr. 162, at p. 181 (Ont . Ch.), per Proudfoot V.C .
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allegedly necessary legal nexus for the intervention of civil courts is this
contract . If this is so, the search for a property or civil right to vindicate
judicial intervention takes on a new meaning. Instead of looking for such
a right as defined historically by the common law, one need merely recall
that all members of religious organizations are ipso facto contractual parties
with a contractual right of enforcement ofall aspects ofthe contract, including
its doctrinal or procedural provisions, or a remedy in lieu. It may be that
the Supreme Court has missed this obvious justification for the exercise
of jurisdiction because the Hutterite cases are, paradoxically, easy cases.
When a fundamental theological tenet is community of property, property
rights are inextricably linked to member expulsion; ritualistic expression
of reluctance to become involved, but for an alleged property right issue,
may easily replace original analysis.
Such a reconstitution of the juridical rationale for the exercise of
jurisdiction would effectively eliminate any requirement for a future court
to justify intervention in disputes in religious organizations . Contractual
enforcement not only obviates judicial selfjustification but also should quell
the fear underlying judicial reluctance to become involved, that is, the fear
of entrapment in doctrinal intricacies. In the first church discipline case in
Canada, Bishop of Columbia v. Cridge,57 Begbie C.J.B.C. stated that civil
courts should not deal with exclusively spiritual matters, and to date, no
cases of that kind have come before the courts . Indeed, it is open to serious
doubt that many ever will . Even in England where an ecclesiastical court
system has existed since the Middle Ages, it was estimated in 1840 that
only about seven cases "even remotely [involving] any question of doctrine"
had been heard in the previous three centuries.s8
The closest courts might come to doctrine is simply to state what the
doctrine may be of a particular religious association in order to resolve
a dispute involving a temporal matter ; for example, in disputes involving
rights to church property when schism occurs, courts are required to state
the principles, often theological, on the basis of which the property is held
in trust, to determine to whom to award the property .59 This does not require
the dictation of theology to a church, but the hearing of evidence, usually
written, about doctrinal standards when property was acquired. As a practical
matter, Anglo-Canadian cases on doctrinal matters have been virtually non57 (1874), 1 B.C .R . (Pt. 1) 5, at p. 11 (B.C .S.C.) . See also Balkou v . Gouleff (1989),

68 O.R. (2d) 574, at p. 576 (C.A .), per Catzman J.A ., where the court could easily have
stated what the doctrine was withoutdictating it to thechurch . The case demonstrates excessive
judicial reluctance.
58 Report to the House of Commons on Appeals in Doctrine and Discipline to the
High Court of Delegates, Pp 1867-68, lvii, 75, xxi, cited in S.M . Waddams, Law, Politics
and the Church of England. The Career of Stephen Lushington 1782-1873 (1992), p. 270,
n. 1.
59 Ogilvie, loc. cit, footnote 33 .
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existent historically; as a practical matter today, it is inconceivable that
ecclesiastical disputants would ever ask courts to make theology for. a
religious organization . Judicial fear of involvement in doctrinal disputes is
both a red herring and a unique limitation on an otherwise unlimited
jurisdiction to enforce the contractual obligations that bind members and
religious associations together.
The second restriction imposed by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Lakeside Colony on the courts, that is, that they should not review the
merits of a decision to expel, may be reconsidered in light of the foregoing.
The context in which this restriction was stated6o shows that the court
favoured judicial review of procedural, but not substantive issues . This
restriction is both. impractical. and unnecessary, considered in the light of
the previous discussion. The Hutterite cases demonstrate the impracticality
of separating procedural and substantive matters. The consensual, nonaggressive style of decision-making, even in expulsion matters, practised by
these communities is based on theological tenets of non-resistance and
passivity as the appropriate Christian response to conflict. To import rules
of naturaljustice into such procedures is to import an adversarial style of
decision-making where none existed explicitly before. While the Hutterite
cases are easy cases on the basis of which to demonstrate the impracticality
of the distinction,_all religious organizations would assert that to a greater
or lesser extent, their procedural rules are theologically grounded.
Judicial intervention is necessarily intrusive. Therefore, the courts are
faced with the stark choice either of becoming involved or, of completely
refraining from involvement. The latter choice condones the injustices which
often characterise church tribunals, while the former attempts to alleviate
them. Once a public policy choice off intervention is made, justice requires
as few limitations as possible on the extent and nature of that intervention .
If the sole limitation is on dictating doctrine, then the Supreme Court's
second restriction is, like the first, drawn too narrowly.. Judicial review of
the merits should extend beyond procedure to substance but stop short of
dictating the substance of the faith. Since doctrinal standards are written
down in a variety of creeds, confessions, constitutions and theological books,
the civil courts have a clear . basis beyond which they should not venture.
After all, the rules ofnaturaljustice are designed to ensure that these standards
are upheld!
The Governing Documents . ofReligious Associations
Lakeside Colony appears to be the first case in which the Supreme

Court of Canada considered the legal status of and interrelationships among
the governing documents of a religious organization, as it had to do, in
order to determine whether the expulsion of the Hofers was in accordance
61 supra, footnote 2, at pp. 175 (S .C .R.), 21 (D .L.R .), 119 (W.W.R.) .
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with the procedural practices of the Hutterites and in accordance with the
rules of natural justice. The governing documents of religious organizations
have rarely been considered by Canadian courts either in themselves or
in relation to civil legislation and the common law. A rare recent case was
Re Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Toronto and HE. C. Hotels Ltd,61
in which the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the relationship of a private
incorporation act and a public general statute, concluding that the former
took precedence over the latter in relation to the specific church for which
the private act was provided 62
As institutions, religious organizations are simply very "messy" to deal
with. Not only does each institution have its own set of governing documents
but even within an individual institution, there are normally a variety of
documents, both secular and theological, whose interrelationships are often
left to the civil courts to sort out. Typically, governing documents may
include any number of the following: federal private legislation; provincial
private legislation (for the same religious institution) ; federal and/or
provincial legislation for specific national or provincial parts of a religious
institution; provincial private legislation for individual synods, dioceses,
presbyteries, congregations, parishes or related eleemosynary organizations;
articles of association, bylaws, both for national and local bodies ; canon
law; manuals of procedure and/or discipline; public general statutes, both
federal and provincial, relating to religious organizations; confessions; creeds ;
statements of faith; theological treatises and ecclesiastical customs, which
may differ from place to place. Typically, counsel for the parties in disputes
involving religious organizations will pre-select for the courts the governing
documents specific to the case, but courts must still be prepared to determine
the hierarchical authority of these documents in relation to the facts before
them and the possibility that counsel have omitted to argue relevant
documents.
In Lakeside Colony, four sources of authority were at issue: a federal
act incorporating the Hutterian Brethren ;63 the constitution of that church
to which all Hutterite colonies subscribe; the articles of association of the
Lakeside Colony ; and the oral traditions and customs of the Hutterites . The
court found that the federal act cast the top layer of the Hutterian Brethren
Church in legislative form as a single incorporated body to respond to
external threats to the Hutterite colonies generally. While the board of
managers of the church had statutory authority over discipline pursuant
to the act, the court found that because the corporation and the church
were two distinct entities, the provisions of the constitution of the church
61 (1987), 44 D.L.R . (4th) 161, 61 O.R . (2d) 737 (Ont . C.A .) .
62 See generally: M.H. Ogilvie, The Legal Status of Ecclesiastical Corporations (1989),

15 Can. Bus. L.J . 74.
63 S.C. 1951, c. 71 .
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relating to discipline took priority in relation to the question of who may
discipline . The constitution . provides,: that expulsion -of a member should
be determined by the particular colony and Lakeside Colony's own articles
ofassociation contained provisions in that regard, which were to be construed
in keeping with the oral customs and traditions of the Hutterites . Finally,
the court examined the articles, dealing with apparent inconsistencies in
the light of Hutterite practice, to conclude that a vote to expel is required,
even if a consensual rather . -than a formal vote is taken. To reach this integration of the four : sources of Hutterite authority
relating to Hofer's expulsion, the court was several times forced to choose
between apparently conflicting- provisions and relied, on oral tradition and
custom to make each choice, assuming that these were implied-terms - of
the Hutterite contract .64 The court admitted the difficulties associated with
this analytical process, especially given: its external perspective, in contrast
to the internal point of view-of the Hutterites for whom tradition and custom
are, in, fact, the highest source of authority6s, Legislation, constitutions and
articles of association were, after all, required to interface with the Canadian
civil authorities in relation to dealing with property and similar civil matters
and of little import to daily life. on a colony. The ultimate source then,
of the court's self-admitted hesitancy in dealing with the authorities was
the authorities themselves : they had accumulated over time, each added
in response to a particular civil or religious issue, and therefore lacked
synthesis. -Even the Hutterites themselves were uncertain as to whether the
corporation created by the legislation was identical with the sect enjoying
continuous historical existence since formed by Jacob Hutter in the midsixteenth century.
Given these inherent difficulties in litigation involving .religious organizations, the significance of the court's attempt to guide its adjudications
by reference to these governing documents lies in its implicit assumption
that these constituted contractual documents binding oil the members and
enforceable, prima facie, by the courts . The contractual analogy is seen in
ether types of disputes .66 The contract consists of express terms, such as
those listed above, and implied terms, the oral customs end traditions of
the church . Membership is voluntary; even Hutteritess are free to leave at
any time although the economic terms of so doing are harsh, yet well-known.
Judicial intervention is kept to a minimum by the -determination of disputes
in compliance with the contract . As with commercial contracts, the
presumption is one of enforcement, with actual intervention or judicial
contract making resorted to only in situations in which some vitiating factor
such as illegality - or unconscionability is present. The importation, of the
64
6s
66

Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 190-192 (S .C .R.), 32-33 (D .L.R .); 130-131 (W.w.R.) .
Ibid., at pp . 190 (S .C .R.), 32 (D:L.R.), 130 (w.WR.) .
Ogilvie, loc. cit, footnotes 33, 34.
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rules of natural justice might, therefore, be seen by analogy as a procedural
intervention to ensure that justice is done between the parties.67 Therefore,
it is submitted that the contractual analogy could be developed in cases
involving member expulsion to sustain both judicial intervention and
minimal judicial intervention .
Natural Justice
The importation of the rules of natural justice into the procedures of
religious organizations by the courts by way ofjudicial review is undeniably
judicial interference with those institutions, many of which are governed
by centuries-old procedures pre-dating the evolution of judicial review and
natural justice, and lacking rules of natural justice. Simply to require these
of religious organizations is to interfere, since the organizations themselves
may not wish to have them, for reasons based on their doctrine or polity .
In Lakeside Colony, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that
the content and application ofthe principles ofnaturaljustice must be flexible,
accounting for the circumstances in which they are applied6 8 The court
stated that the three most basic rules of naturaljustice, notice, an opportunity
to be heard and an unbiased tribunal, are required of religious organizations,
although on the facts, the court thought it necessary to find only breach
of the right to notice.
With respect to the nature and content of the notice requirement, the
court held that sufficient notice includes not just notice that the member
be informed of the cause for which he may possibly be expelled at the
meeting, but that such notice also be timely and adequate . 69 Timely and
adequate notice gives both the person under censure and the other members
of the meeting time to consider the issues and to make appropriate
arrangements to attend the meeting.70
Securing an unbiased tribunal is particularly difficult within the context
of religious associations since almost any tribunal, no matter how constituted,
will include persons familiar with the member and the issues, indeed having
a special interest in the outcome. The Supreme Court refrained from further
addressing the issue of how an unbiased tribunal might be struck because
the parties presented no argument on the matter71 Nor did the court further
comment on the right ofaudi alterampartem,7 2 preferring instead to conclude
that there was a breach of the right of notice. It may be suggested that
67 This argument is fully developed in Ogilvie, loc. cil, footnote 34, at pp. 607, 614.
68 Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 195 (S.C.R .), 36 (D.L .R .), 134 (W .W .R .), per Gonthier

J.; at pp. 226 (S.C.R .), 59 (D .L .R.), 156 (W.W.R .), per McLachlin J.
69 Ibid, at pp. 196 (S .C .R.), 36 (D .L.R .), 134 (W.W.R.).
7° Cohen v. The Congregation ofHazen Avenue Synagogue, supra, footnote 39.
71 Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 197 (S.C .R.), 37 (D.L .R.), 135 (W.W.R .).
72 Ibid, at pp . 196 (S .C .R.), 37 (D .L.R .), 135 (W.W.R.).
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removal of the dispute either to another colony or to a tribunal of ministers
drawn from other colonies may provide an unbiased tribunal and still be
within Hutterite custom, although somewhat unusual . That procedure is
occasionally used in other religious organizations to ensure a tribunal as
unbiased as possible, given the close nature of life within such institutions .
It may well be that the practical incorporation of the rules of natural justice
into the procedures of religious organizations will always be problematical.
While earlier lower court decisions in Canada have suggested that rules
of natural justice be incorporated into internal ecclesiastical proceedings,
as have courts in the United States and Scotland (although not yet England),73
Lakeside Colony is the first Supreme Court case to have done so in relation
to such institutions and should serve as a basis for their further application
in the future.

Conclusion

The practical result of the decision of the Supreme-Court of Canada
in Lakeside Colony of .Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer was to sustain Hofer's
claim to be a member of the Colony with a correlative right to live and
work there. Lakeside Colony remained a divided community . However,
the Supreme Court also handed back to the Colony the right and the duty
of resolving its own disputes. No court addressed the issue at the heart
of the matter, Hofer's claim to the patent in the hog feeder, which'conflicted
with the contentious, new style of "management" introduced into the
Hutterian Brethren Church by the present senior elder. The Hutterites have
been left to themselves- to determine their own .future . Thus, while judicial
intervention amounted to procedural interference, by requiring guarantees
of fairness not necessarily inherent in Hutterite decision-making, it did not
go to the substantive theological issues of the future nature of Hutterite
institutional life in relation to property owning or polity.

This is usually the result when courts intervene in . disputes involving
religious 'organizations . At the end of the day, judiial intervention is
considerably less insidious than first imagined. Provided the courts look
to the contract on which the religious association is based,, with a view
to enforcement, curial interference with freedom of religion is virtually nonexistent . It may be that the contract analogy is the best legal safeguard. for
freedom of religion in Canadian law for religious institutions.
Therefore, expressions of judicial reluctance to become involved are
unnecessary, provided the courts acknowledge the one limitation beyond
which they ought never to go, dictating theological norms in relation to
the doctrine and polity of a religious organization. In any case, it is salutary
to recall that much of the work of the Deformation was accomplished not
by theologians or elders, but by the laity of Western Europe acting through
73

These cases are cited in Ogilvie, loc. cit., footnotes 33 and 34 . .
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town councils, royal courts and parliaments to impose beneficial reforms
on a church which had successfully resisted internal reformation for several
centuries .
Once Martin Luther was asked why he set the hymns which he wrote
for the worship of the newly Reformed church to some of the most popular
songs of his day. Luther replied: "Why must the Devil have the best tunes?"
Religious organizations which resent the intrusion of the civil courts should,
to paraphrase Luther, ask themselves, "Why must the Devil have the best
rules of procedure?" .

RES JUDICATA-RETROSPECTIVITY AND JUDICIAL CHANGE
IN THE LAW: Amopharm v. Harris Computer.
Peter E.J. Wells and Chi-Kun Shi*
Introduction

The decision in Morguard v. De Savoyel brought an unexpected, yet
nevertheless welcome change in the law respecting interprovincial enforcement of judgments. The case and the new approach it propounded were
discussed in detail by Professor Joost Blom in a case comment in this
Review .z The decision in Amopharm Inc. v. Harris Computer Corp. 3 raises
a serious question of how this change in the law is to be managed and
graphically illustrates the tension between the need for the common law
to adapt to changes in society and yet simultaneously provide a dependable
framework to guide the conduct of daily affairs. "Law must be stable, and
yet it cannot stand still." 4
Amopharm and Magypharm, Quebec corporations carrying on business in that province, purchased a computer system and software from
Harris which was based in Ontario . By 1983, Amopharm and Magypharm
claimed the system did not work, and Harris claimed it was not fully paid.

* Peter E.J. Wells and Chi-Kun Shi, both of Lang Michener, Toronto, Ontario.
1 [199013 S.C.R. 1077, (1990), 76 D.L .R . (4th) 256.
2 J. Blom (1991), 70 Can Bar Rev. 733.
3 (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 524, 10 O.R . (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.).
4 R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923), p. 1 .
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Amopharm and Magypharm sued in Quebec claiming for rescission
of the contract and other relief. Harris was served in Ontario in accordance
with the formal requirements of Quebec law. Harris elected not to appear
in Quebec to dispute either jurisdiction or the merits . In September, 1987,
the Quebec Superior Courtgranted rescission together with damages, interest
and costs. In October, 1988 the Quebec plaintiffs sued Harris in Ontario
on the Quebec judgment . Harris responded with a motion for .summary
judgment which was heard by Oyen J. On the law as it was understood
at the time, before Morguard, Oyen J. dismissed the plaintiffs' action. Her
decision was not appealed .
Thus restricted to Quebec, the plaintiffs proceeded to issue out writs
of execution to attach funds owed to Harris by its other Quebec customers.
arris sprang into action and attacked, the writs, but did not attack the
judgment itself or question thejurisdiction ofQuebec's Superior Court. While
it demonstrated some procedural errors in the writs, these were corrected.
The Quebec plaintiffs then commenced new proceedings in Ontario
alleging that Harris' attack on the writs amounted to .attornment, and moved
for summary judgment on the whole of the original claim. This motion came
before McWilliam J.' who dismissed the action. Apparently the motion
material filed before McWilliam J. included all the affidavits and other
material from the first action before Oyen J. This time the Quebec plaintiffs
appealed, and between judgment at trial and the hearing of the appeal, the
Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Morguard. McWilliam
J. had held (as all three judges in the Court of Appeal said he did correctly)
that Harris' attack on the writs did not constitute attornment to the Quebec
Superior Court. Having found that McWilliam J. had correctly decided the
issue placed before him by the parties, the majority in the Court of Appeal
then turned to consider the evidence from the first action (from the material
filed before McWilliam J.) and the change in the law effected by Morguard.
The majority (Brooke and Doherty JJ.A .) held that the material filed
before McWilliam J. (including the material from the first action) satisfied
the Morguard test, and consequently allowed the appeal, granting judgment
in Ontario to the Quebec plaintiffs :5
In my opinion, in these unusual circumstances we should not decline to follow the
judgment in Morguard solely because the pleadings sought relief on the ground of
attornment . Further, in the unusual circumstances of the case, I do not regard the
judgment of Oyen J. as a bar, nor the issue before us as res judicata . That decision
depended on facts not in issue here and stood to be decided on different principles.
I think we should enforce the judgment of the Superior Court of Quebec .

There is no unfairness to the defendant in granting judgment unless it can be
said that the defendant should not be caught by a change in the law and deprived
of an opportunity to fight the case on its merits . There is no statement in an affidavit
whichsuggests that therespondent has a good defence'on the merits .The only indication
5 Supra, footnote 3, at pp . 5288-529b (D .L.R.), 32b-f (O .R:).
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of the nature of its position is, as set out above, that it had not been properly paid .
But it made no such claim in the courts of this province and declined the opportunity
to make such a claim in Quebec.

This comment will examine both the issues of resjudicata and the "unusual
circumstances" which are said to explain this result .
It is important to note the effect of the majority decision . Brooke and
Doherty JJ.A. found that "McWilliam J. held that the respondent had not
attorned to the jurisdiction of the Quebec Court. In so doing he correctly
followed and applied the judgment of Houlden J.A. in Clinton v. Ford" .6
In effect, the decision which had been appealed (that of McWilliam J.)
was affirmed while the decision which had never been appealed (that of
Oyen J.) was reversed .
Res Judicata
The requirements for res judicata have been summarized as?
(i) that the alleged judicial decision was what in law is deemed such;

(ii) that the particular judicial decision relied upon was in fact pronounced, as alleged;
(iii) that the judicial tribunal pronouncing the decision had competent jurisdiction
in that behalf;
(iv) that the judicial decision was final;
(v) that the judicial decision was, or involved, a determination of the same question
as that sought to be controverted in the litigation in which the estoppel is raised ;
(vi) that the parties to the judicial decision, or their privies, were the same persons
as the parties to the proceeding in which the estoppel is raised, or their privies,
or that the decision was conclusive in rent.

With respect to the proceedings before Oyen J.:
the
(i)
judgment on the motion for summaryjudgment was a judicial
determination;
(ii) the Court of Appeal accepted as fact that it had been pronounced
as alleged;
(iii) Oyen J. clearly had competent jurisdiction;
(iv) her decision was final ; and
(vi) the parties were the same in both Ontario actions .
The distinction drawn by Brooke J.A . relates to item (v) of the
requirements for res judicata-the identity of action or issue . Whether or
not one can say that the facts which were determinative of the issue before

6 Amopharm Inc. v. Harris Computer Corp., supra, footnote 3, at pp. 528a-b (D .L.R.),
31e (O .R.) . (Emphasis added) .
7 G. Spencer Bower and A.K. Turner, Doctrine of Res Judicata (2d ed ., 1969). The
passage set out in the text has been quoted and applied in Re Bullen (1971), 21 D.L .R.
(3d) 628, at p. 631 (B.C.S .C .) and Duhamel v. The Queen (1981), 131 D.L .R. (2d) 352,
at p. 356, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 127, at pp . 131-132 (Alta. C.A .), aff'd, [1984) 2 S.C.R . 555,
(1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 92 .
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®yen J. were not in issue before the Court of Appeal, the fact remains
that the cause of action in both cases was upon the Quebec judgment . ®yen
J. decided that the Quebec judgment was not enforceable in Ontario and
the effect of that decision was completely reversed by the Court of Appeal .
One of the principles upon which res judicata rests is that no one should
be twice troubled for one and the same cause of action .(nemo debit bis
vexart pro una et eadam causa) . As well, there is the interest of the state
in having an end to litigation .(interest republicae ut sitfinis fduyn). If the
majority of the Court of Appeal are correct in Amopharm v. Harris, every
party who obtained àjudgment outside Ontario within the last twenty years$
and subsequently failed to have it found enforceable in Ontario is perfectly
free to sue again in light of the Morguard decision .
Not only does resjudicata prevent thesame causeof action being asserted
a second time, it also applies, except in special cases, to prevent the parties .
from relitigating not only the points upon which the court was actually re
quired by the parties to fmrm an opinion but also all points which the parties,
acting with reasonable diligence, might have brought forward for consideration . The first branch of res judicata is referred to as "cause of action
estoppel" while the second is referred to as "issue estoppeP'. The exception
for special cases is generally regarded as applying only to issue estoppel.
If there is any meaning to the branch of res judicata called cause of
action estoppel, and indeed the maxim that no one should be twice troubled
for one and the same-cause, the answer to the problem raised in Amcpharm
v. Harris cannot be simply one of testing whether the doctrine of resjudicata
applies. The facts that existed when the matter was heard by Oyen J. were
identical to those which were considered by the Court of Appeal (the
intervention by Harris in Quebec with respect to the writs 'of execution
having been held to be legally irrelevant) . The only difference was that
the common law rules for enforcement of extra-provincial judgments had
changed. The question is, should this make a difference?
It has been suggested that in some cases a change in the law might
prevent the application of res judicata. Re Rullen9 is'occasionally referred
to in support of this proposition. With respect, Re Rullen does not stand
for such proposition since res judicata was applied. However, the court
did state in obiter that if the question in issue was .the effect of restraints
on anticipation and alienation, then res judicata would not have been a
bar since such restraints had been made ineffective by statute following
the first decision .
The Supreme Court of Canada in Re Manitoba Language Rights'O
clearly held the view that a holding that the laws of Manitoba were
8 See Limitations Act, R.S.0_ 1990, c. L.15, s. 45(1)(c). .
9 Supra, footnote 7.
10 [1955] 1 S.C .R. 721, at p. 757.
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constitutionally invalid would not permit the re-opening of cases decided
under those laws on the basis of res judicata . However, this too was obiter.
The conflict between the two cases is more apparent than real . The
issue addressed in the obiter in Re Bullen was an impediment which prevented
a married woman from selling real estate . Once the impediment was removed
(either by the woman losing her status as a married woman or the subsequent
abolition of such restraint) such sale became possible . Thus, any future sale
would be permitted which previously would have been barred . However,
nothing in Re Bullen suggests that the abolition of the restraint would have
permitted anyone to revive a purported sale contracted when the restraint
was legally effective and certainly not if the issue had been judicially
determined. In other words, where the question for judicial determination
is different, res judicata is no bar. On the other hand, in the hypothetical
case canvassed in Re Manitoba Language Rights the issue of validity of
the law would have been an issue determined, albeit implicitly, in all prior
judicial decisions, and even if such decision were later shown to be wrong,
the "wrong" answer would continue to bind the prior litigants.
In England the issue ofchange in the law and resjudicata was addressed
in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank . , 1 The case concerned a lease which
provided for rent review in 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2004. In the course
of the 1983 review (which set rent for the period 1983-1988) a clause in
the lease came to be construed. Only a limited right to seek review of the
arbitrator's decision was available. Subsequent cases were accepted as
establishing that the approach taken in the 1983 review was wrong in law.
When the 1988 review was begun the tenants attempted by way of an
action for a declaration to argue that the construction of the clause ought
to be different than had been the case in the first review . The landlord
moved to dismiss the claim for a declaration on the ground that the tenants
were barred by issue estoppel from relitigating the question . Since the 19831988 period was not in issue it was not a case of cause of action estoppel.
However, it was a case of issue estoppel but the court applied the exception
for special cases. As expressed by Lord Keith of Kinke1 :12
The public interest in seeing an end to litigation is of little weight in circumstances
underwhich, failing agreement, there must in any event be arbitrationat each successive
review date. Estoppel per rem judicatam, whether cause of action estoppel or issue
estoppel, is essentially concerned with preventing abuse of process. In the present
case I consider that abuse of process would be favoured rather than prevented by
refusing the plaintiffs permission to reopen the disputed issue. Upon the whole matter
I find myself in respectful agreement with the passage in thejudgment of Sir Nicholas
Browne-Wilkinson V.C. where he said [1989] Ch. 63, 70-71:

11 [1989] Ch . 63, [1988] 3 All E.R. 977 (Ch. D.), affd . [1990] Ch . 573, [1990] 1
All E.R. 529 (C .A.), affd. [1991] 2 A.C . 93, [1991] 3 All E.R. 41 (H.L .) .
12 Ibid., at pp . 110F-11IC (A.C.), 51j-52d (All E.R.) (H .L.) .

1993]

Commentaires d'arrêts

259

"In my judgment a change in the law subsequent to the first decision is capable
of bringing the case within the, exception to issue estoppel . If, as I think, the
yardstick of whether issue estoppel should be held to apply is the justice to the
parties, injustice can. flow as much from a subsequent change in the law as from
the subsequent discovery of newfacts. In both cases theinjusticelies in a successful
party to the first action being held to have rights which in fact he does not
possess. I can therefore see no reason for holding that a subsequent change in
the law can never be sufficient to bring the case within the exception. Whether
or not such a change does or does not bring the case within the exception must
depend on the exact circumstances . of each case ."
I am satisfied, in agreement with both courts below, that the instant case presents
special circumstances such as to require the plaintiffs to be permitted to reopen the
question of construction decided against them by walton J., that being a decision
which I regard as plainly wrong.

It was perhaps significant that a rent review for the 1988 to 1993 period
was required in any event; the only question was whether certain principles
to be used in such review were to be taken as settled between the parties.

Change in the Lain
There is no doubt that the principles of the common law are constantly
subject to examination by the courts and, over a period of time, they evolve .
That said, a sharp change in the law such as occurred in Morguard is most
commonly effected by statutory enactment. Where there has been such a
sharp change in the law, it is inevitable that earlier identical or similar cases
will have been finally decided differently. Having concluded in Morguard
that the previous law was inadequate in the face of the realities of increased
trade within a federal state, the Supreme Court of Canada elected to make
â break with the past. The policy choice then is whether this break should
begin, as in fact it did, with Morguard or whether we should attempt to
remake history and extend this principle indefinitely into the past.
There,is a presumption that the enactments of parliament do not operate
retrospectively, unless by express words or necessary implication it appears
that. such was the intention of parliament. This principle is discussed by
riedger.13 Driedger points out that the words retrospective and retroactive
are used interchangeably in the reports and texts in the discussion of this
principle, but he himselfmakes a distinction. He employs the word retroactive
to describe â statute which makes the law different from what it was in
fact -during a period prior to its enactment, either because it is stated to
be deemed to come into force at a time prior to its enactment, or it is
expressly stated to be operative with respect to past transactions as of a
past time. Driedger uses the term retrospective to describe a statute which
attaches a , new duty, penalty, or disability to _ an event which took place
before its enactment. However, if a statute imposes a -disability on the basis
of status, it cannot be said to operate retrospectively if a disability attaches
13 E.A . Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed., 1993), pp . 185-203.
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to all persons of a particular status-even if the status had been acquired
before the enactment creating the disability . For instance, if a higher scale
of marginal income tax rates were added to the Income Tax Act to apply
to all persons having a net worth in excess of $1,000,000 would anyone
suggest it operated retrospectively when applied to persons who passed the
threshold value before such amendment?
The distinction between legislation having retroactive effect and
retrospective effect is this. While both attach new duties or penalties to
conduct which occurred before the enactment of the legislation, retroactive
legislation pretends to apply as if it had been the law in effect before it
was actually enacted, while retrospective legislation only purports to apply
from the date ofits enactment, even though it attaches new duties or penalties
from that date forward to conduct which predated its enactment.
Where a change in the common law is effected by a decision such
as Morguard it has retrospective effect in that new duties or disabilities
attach to past conduct. The rules are changed. But for the change in the
law effected by the Supreme Court of Canada De Savoye's conduct would
not have subjected him to the Alberta judgment in British Columbia
(although he could have been sued on the mortgage itself in British
Columbia). Since a judgment which effects a change in the law must, of
necessity, be based upon facts which predate the judgment and thus the
change in the law, such a judicial change must operate retrospectively . The
question is, ought it to operate retroactively and make the law different
from what it was in fact prior to the decision which effected the change?
The only change in circumstances between the decision of Oyen J. and
that of the Court of Appeal was the change in the law effected by Morguard.
The effect of the Court of Appeal's decision was to revisit the issue that
had been decided by Oyen J. on the basis of the "new" law which was
not in effect when her decision had been made, and remake the decision
as if Morguard had been the law at the time Oyen J. rendered herjudgment.
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered the issue of the "effective
date" of judicial changes to the law in the criminal cases of R. v. Thomas14
and R. v. Wigman.1s The test and its rationale were set out in Wigman:lb
The appropriate test is whether or not the accused is still in the judicial system . As
expressed in the Crown's factum, this test affords a means of striking a balance between
the "wholly impractical dream of providing perfectjustice to allthose convicted under
the overruled authority andthepractical necessity of having some finality in the criminal
process" .

In Wigman, the change in the law had occurred while Wigman's appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada was pending. In Thomas, the accused
was not so lucky. He was convicted of second degree murder in 1984 on
14 [199011 S.C.R. 713, (1990), 75 C.R. (2d) 352.

11 [198711 S.C.R. 246, (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 530.
16 ]bid, at pp . 257 (S.C.R.), 538 (D .L.R .).
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the basis of section 213(a) of the Criminal Code17 and appealed to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal. The only issue raised on the appeal was a
complaint with respect to expert evidence-no constitutional issue was
raised. ®n December 10, 1986, while Thomas' appeal was pending, R.
v. Vaillancourm was argued before the Supreme Court of Canada. The
decision in Vaillancourt was reserved . While Vaillancourt was under reserve
Thomas' appeal was argued and dismissed by the British Columbia Court
of Appeal on January 26, 1987 . The decision in Vaillancourt, which struck
down section 213(d) of the Criminal Code, was released on December 3,
1987. In December, 1989 Thomas applied for leave and for an extension
of time for his application. The court held that :19
To be in the judicial system one of the following must apply:
1. an appeal has been launched to this Court;
2. an application for leave has been made within the time; or
3. an application for an extensionof time is granted based on the criteria that normally
apply in such cases.

The court also held that while an appellant should not be placed in a worse
position than any other applicant, on the other hand an applicant "should
not artificially be brought into the system" .20 As a result, Thomas' application
for an_ extension of time and the application for leave which depended upon
it were dismissed.
A particularly striking application of the Wigman principle can be seen
in R. v. Kivell 21 Kivell was co-accused with Allan Rodney on a charge of
murder. Kivell pleaded guilty in 1984 and was convicted of second degree
murder. Rodney pleaded not guilty and was convicted of second degree murder
after a jury trial. He appealed and was granted a new trial so that he might
have the opportunity to claim the benefit of the "new" law on "constructive
murder" under section 213 of the Criminal Code on the basis of Vaifancourt
which had been decided while his appeal was pending. In September 1990,
the Supreme Court ofCanada approved the British Columbia Court ofAppeal's
decision, to grant Rodney a new trial. Within a. month Kivell was before
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, some six years after his guilty plea,
seeking an extension of time to appeal his conviction. The application was
denied on the basis of R. v. Thomas. The court said :2

A line has been drawn which necessarily leaves anomalies; anomalies can, no doubt,
in appropriate cases, be redressed by the granting of ministerial relief, but will not
be eliminated by "moving theline". Were the line to be redrawn so as to accommodate
this case the result, in my view, would certainly be to create other, and perhaps more
significant, anomalies. .

R.S .C. 1970, c. C-34 . See new R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 230(a) .
18 [198712 S.C .R. 636.
19 Supra, footnot6 14, at pp. 716 (S .C .R.), 355 (C.R .) .
17

z° dbfd
21

22

[1990] B.C .J. No. 2430 (C .A.).
dbid, at p. 10.
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While it may seem unfortunate that whether one obtains the benefit
of "new" law is at least partly serendipitous, the only alternative to the
Wigman test involves remaking history and requires that fundamental
principles such as resjudicata be ignored.
Conclusion
Where a change is effected in the common law by a judicial decision,
such change acts retrospectively on cases "in the system" at the time of
the decision . It does not act retroactively so as to affect cases which had
gone through the system before the decision effecting the change . In effect,
this is the result arrived at in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank,23 which
allowed application of the "correct" construction in future rent reviews but
did not purport to interfere with the rent reviews which had previously
been finally concluded. The majority decision in Amopharm, with respect,
failed to consider adequately res judicata, and appreciate the retroactive
effect of its decision.
It also appears that one of the factors considered significant by the
majority was an apparent failure of Harris to suggest "that the respondent
has a good defence on the merits".24 Since the Ontario action was based
on the Quebec judgment the "merits" concerned the enforceability of that
judgment. The merits of the contract dispute were irrelevant to the plaintiffs'
cause of action . Harris' contention was that the Quebec court lacked
jurisdiction and that Amopharm had to establish its contract claim in Ontario
and afford Harris an opportunity to defend "on the merits". If Harris
genuinely lacked a "good defence on the merits", an Ontario action on
the contract could have been the subject of a summary judgment motion .
The extra delay and cost this might have occasioned to the Quebec plaintiffs
surely does not justify stripping Harris Computer of a final judicial
determination in Ontario that, if the plaintiffs had a complaint with the
computer, they would have to litigate it "on the merits" in Ontario .
Not only does this decision do considerable violence to the principle
of res judicata, in allowing an appeal from the judgment of McWilliam
J. who was specifically found to have correctly decided the question placed
before him, the decision also does considerable violence to the function
of an appellate court:
And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for
the public good than equity without law; which would make every judge a legislator,
and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many different
rulesof action laid down in our courts, as there aredifferences of capacity and sentiment
in the human mind.25

23 Supra, footnote 11 .
24 Amopharm Inc. v. Harris Computer Corp., supra, footnote 3, at pp. 529a-b (D.L .R .),

32e (O.R .) .
25 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), Book I, p. 62 .

